Fake News: A Study on the Evaluation of the Turkish citizens of news about the Syrian Immigrants

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DECLARATION

I confirm that this dissertation represents my original research work. I faithfully and accurately cited all work of others, including Internet sources, which I consulted and quoted.

I declare that I understood the concept of plagiarism.

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Signature

ABSTRACT

In the present study, it was investigated whether the Turkish citizens believe the fake news about the Syrian immigrants. Turkish citizens have experienced living together with Syrian immigrants since 2011. With the increase in the number of immigrants and their involvement in social life in Turkey, tension between the Turkish citizens and the Syrian immigrants has emerged. Accordingly, particularly in social media, fake news about them has been fabricated and disseminated.

The reasons behind fake news production may be a profit motive or ideological drivers. In terms of audience, according to the 'motivated reasoning approach', pre-existing beliefs and perceptions such as intolerance against minority groups or different ethnicities and cultures encourage the creation of an environment suitable for the proliferation of fake news. In this context, the question of what are the factors that may affect the belief in fake news was examined.

Keywords: Syrian Immigrants, fake news, motivated reasoning

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CHAPTER I

1.1 Introduction

In March 2011, some protests erupted in Syria, generally accepted as a continuation of Arab Spring which had taken place in some of the North African and the Middle Eastern countries. The high-handed response of the Syrian government to protesters prompted demonstrations demanding President Assad's resignation. Opposition groups announced the formation of the Free Syrian Army to overthrow the government. With participation of other religious and ethnic groups such as Al-Nusra, Hezbollah, the jihadist group Islamic State (IS), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) mainly controlled by Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), the conflict evolved into a civil war. Involvement of an international coalition led by the United States and Russia with allies that support the existing government has broadened the war to an international level conflict.[1]

The ongoing war gives rise to a humanitarian crisis. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a Britain-based war monitor initiative, has declared the death toll as more than 321,000 people since the start of the war and more than 145,000 others had been reported as missing in six years of fighting as of March 13, 2017.[2] According to the data of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of registered Syrian Refugees reaches 5,136,969. 2 million of them are registered in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, more than 30,000 registered in North Africa' as of 6 July 2017.[3] 3,088,061 are registered by the Government of Turkey as of 13.07.2017.[4]

Turkey has attempted to manage one of the largest immigration waves so far in its recent history. The authorities provide economic support, psychological support with rehabilitation programmes, training for adults and formal education for young people, and health care services. However, Turkish citizens' positive attitudes such as compassion and empathy toward immigrants,

[1] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/syria-civil-war-explained-160505084119966.html, (Accessed: July 2017)
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868, (Accessed: July 2017)
[2] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-casualties-idUSKBN16K1Q1, (Accessed: July 2017)
[3] http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php, (Accessed: July 2017)
[4] http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik, (Accessed: July 2017)

based on the consideration that they were forced to leave their homes due to the war, have changed over time.

For instance, on 4th July 2017, in Ankara, capital of Turkey, because of the circulation of a rumor on social media that a Syrian immigrant raped a five-year-old girl, a fight broke out between Turkish citizens and the Syrians. Hundreds of people took to the street to fight and the police had to use plastic bullets to disperse people. The governor of Ankara, Ercan Topaca, called for people being calm and warned them not to believe fake news posted on social media for provocation purposes.[5]

This kind of news often occurs in the media in Turkey. Incidents resulting in serious injuries or moving the Syrian people to another place to live in safety have been witnessed.

Fake news spreading through the online environment may cause insurmountable consequences, damage social peace, increase polarization, harm people's sense of security and even threaten people's lives.

The lies that have the potential to influence the public's mind are not new fact in politics, history or in journalism. Although the Oxford Dictionary announced 'post-truth' as the word of the year in 2016, which is defined as 'circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief'[6], it was first used in 1992 by Serbian-American playwright Steve Tesich. Ralph Keyes also used this term in his book 'Post-truth Era' in 2004, and he describes it as 'the loss of a stigma attached to telling lies, and a widespread acceptance of the fact that lies can be told with impunity' (Keyes, 2004, p. 9). The increase of fake news is associated with a diminishing of the importance of facts and truths in comparison with emotions.

It is widely accepted that the US Presidential Election in 2016 and Brexit campaign caused fake news to be discussed intensely[7]. Fake news including conspiracy theories such as 'FBI agent

[5] http://www.diken.com.tr/ankarada-tecavuz-soylentisi-uzerine-suriyelilere-saldiri-bir-multeci-yaralandi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[6] http://www.newsweek.com/donald-trump-and-brexit-make-post-truth-word-year-521731, (Accessed: July 2017)
[7] https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/14/fake-news-donald-trump-election-alt-right-social-media-tech-companies, (Accessed: July 2017)

suspected in Hillary email leaks found dead in apparent murder-suicide', or 'Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President, Releases Statement' were circulated during the election period[8]. According to the Buzzfeed website, behind some websites producing fake news about the US Presidential Election were young people living in a small village of Macedonia (Silverman and Alexander, 2016), allegedly supported by Russia[9].

With the prevalence of fake news, questions such as 'What is the purpose of the production of fake news?', 'How fake is news disseminated so quickly?', 'Why do people tend to believe fake news?' have been widely discussed in academia and in the media. There are various explanations for this. One of them is financial incentive. It is understood from an interview made with Macedonian teenagers producing and publishing fake news that they explored how to monetize the operation of algorithms of social media platforms, mainly Facebook and Twitter, and search engines such as Google, and how to build a click-bait headline and a news-like report[10]. They also observed that driving online traffic to their websites is associated with the popularity of the candidates and the behavior of their supporters'[11].

Generating fake news can also be explained with political purposes. These purposes can have both a short-term nature, such as to win an election or referendum, and a long-term one such as to cultivate certain political viewpoints or to bring people having similar political interests together to set in motion when necessary. Fake news generated for political purposes can be used by a political actor(s)[12] or a political party(ies) as well as by an anonymous person(s). Even if fake news generated only with a political purpose resembles propaganda or political spin, there are differences between them. For example, in political spin, the media may choose to emphasize one specific point of an event while deliberately dismissing others, or select to use certain words depending on which side

[8] https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/fake-news-survey?utm_term=.xnEEeeXZWL#.fgKPNNM1Rw , (Accessed: July 2017)
[9] https://www.ft.com/content/333fe6bc-c1ea-11e6-81c2-f57d90f6741a, (Accessed: August 2017)
[10] http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/fake-news-how-partying-macedonian-teen-earns-thousands-publishing-lies-n692451, (Accessed: July 2017)
[11] https://www.wired.com/2017/02/veles-macedonia-fake-news/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[12] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/two-pictures-that-prove-donald-trump-is-lying-inauguration-crowds-washington-dc-womens-march-barack-a7539876.html, (Accessed: August 2017)

they are standing at. However, what is in question here is not different interpretations of a fact, but to explain something that never actually happened, that is, to lie openly with intent to deceive or misguide people.

Predicting that the Syrian people will stay in Turkey as long as the war continues, and some of them may continue to live in Turkey even though the war ends, it is important to create awareness about fake news, its potential negative effects, especially in a crisis period or on critical issues. Accordingly, the main purpose of this dissertation is to understand the tendency of the citizens of Turkey to believe fake news about the Syrian people. In this dissertation, it is argued that the Turkish people tend to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants, and that they encounter these news reports mostly on social media. The factors that affect the beliefs of the Turkish citizens are examined according to the 'motivated reasoning approach.'

In this dissertation, firstly, it is focused on the main characteristics of fake news by discussing relevant concepts, the factors that cause people to believe them, the methods of struggling against fake news.

Secondly, information about the Syrian war, Turkey's politics on this issue and conditions of the Syrian immigrants in Turkey will be given. Turkish citizens' perceptions of the Syrian people with the examples of studies attempting to measure attitudes of the Turkish people towards the Syrians will be discussed.

Lastly, the details of the survey and the findings will be explained and discussed.

CHAPTER II

2.1. Fake News

2.1.1. Definition of Fake News

Ahmed Al Sheikh who is the former chief editor of Al Jazeera Arabic and reporter in BBC Arabic says 'This is the post-truth era! It is when lies replace the truth, emotions replace honesty, personal analysis replaces verified information and one opinion replaces multiple opinions.'[13] Ralph Keyes (2004) qualifies 'post-truth era' as it is a time in which fiction intertwines with nonfiction.

One of the most significant points to underline in association with the post-truth era is the emergence of fake news. Fake news come to take a central place in discussions as an undermining factor of rational deliberation.

Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow (2017) define fake news in their study examining political implications of fake news articles reported during the 2016 US presidential elections as 'news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readers' (p.213).

Vivian Schiller, former head of Twitter's news operation, define it more comprehensively. According to her, fake news is 'a content-like object that is a story, an article, a video, a tweet that has been fabricated, completely invented out of thin air, intentionally for the purpose of misleading'.[14]

It is important to emphasize that fake news items are based on intentionally generated stories and can be in various forms such as tweets, headlines, photos, WhatsApp messages or news reports.

It is quite illuminating to note that in some fake news pieces, technically changed or authentic but temporally and spatially inconsistent visual materials may be used as evidence to enhance its effect and credibility.

For example, a photograph showing the Syrian immigrants in a queue in front of a state office for citizenship procedure is used in one of the false news stories in this survey. In reality, this photo was taken when they were in a queue for address notification.

[13] http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/12/media-post-truth-era-161210125419198.html, (Accessed: July 2017)
[14] http://www.npr.org/2016/11/20/502770866/ex-head-of-twitter-news-social-media-companies-alone-shouldn-t-regulate-fake-new, (Accessed: July 2017)

2.1.2. Relevant Terms of Fake News

2.1.2.1. Unintentional Reporting Mistakes

There are various concepts having common and separated characteristics with fake news. One of them is 'unintentional reporting mistakes' as Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) categorize.

Although news reports are claiming to transmit the truth, it is a complicated concept in journalism as well as in philosophy. At one end, there are people work in the news production process such as journalists, publishers and editors who determine the subject of news and how it is presented depending on structural factors in the media environment, their personal preferences, and socio-political and economic conditions in society. At the other end, in consumption of news, there is audience as an active agent gives a meaning what she/he sees on screen. Both sides interpret the truth according to their viewpoints. What is expected from journalists here is being as faithful as possible to the truth. It is worth noting that 'journalism does not pursue truth in an absolute or philosophical sense, but it can and must pursue it in a practical sense. This "journalistic truth" is a process that begins with the professional discipline of assembling and verifying facts. Then journalists try to convey a fair and reliable account of their meaning, valid for now, subject to further investigation'.[15]

In journalism, due to the lack of verification, fake news reports are witnessed. This can be arisen from source's intention to misguide people as well as time limits or difficulties to access true information. In 2004, on news magazine show 60 Minutes in CBS news channel, anchor Dan Rather announced a report just before the presidential election claimed that George W. Bush fulfilled his military service in the Texas Air National Guard avoid serving in Vietnam thanks to his father's clout. After a while, it transpired that documents, which had been used in the report, may not have been authenticated. According to Mary Mapes's memoir, who is the producer of the programme, 'bloggers discovered that the documents seemed to have been typed with Microsoft Word, a program that did not exist in the early 70s'[16]. Even if CBS and Dan Rather apologized at the time, then Rather says

[15] http://americanpressassociation.com/principles-of-journalism/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[16] https://www.theguardian.com/film/2016/mar/03/dan-rather-robert-redford-made-me-look-better-in-truth, (Accessed: July 2017)

‘The process included controversial documents, but no one has ever proved that the documents are not what they purport to be. [Critics] could not attack the basic facts (ibid.)’.

One of the main principles of ethical journalism is that when something will be alleged, the documents and other evidences on which the allegation is based can be verified. As Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel state in their book, ‘The Elements of Journalism’, that ‘verification discipline is what separates journalism from other modes of communication, such as propaganda, fiction or entertainment’.[17] In the above example, it is alleged that the media channels only transmit information obtaining from source by trusting their source.

2.1.2.2. Fake news as a Form of Satire

Fake news can be delivered as satire. Using fabricated stories as irony, certain websites or entertainment TV shows oppose some positions of authorities, and criticize politicians or celebrities. In doing so, they can keep issues on the agenda and attract people’s attention to certain issues. Regina Marchi (2012) observes that

> ‘teens gravitate toward fake news, “snarky” talk radio, and opinionated current events shows more than official news that they describe it as “boring” and “the same”—implying that it was predictable and devoid of any questioning of power, and do so *not* because they are disinterested in news, but because these kinds of sites often provide more substantive discussions of the news that enabled them to understand the larger meanings of political events and develop their own opinions’.
>
> (p.255)

She also finds that although teens are aware of the importance of truth in presenting a news story, they are not satisfied that professional news achieves this, is absolutely truthful, or trustworthy (ibid., p.257).

In Turkey, there are some websites in this form that use fake news as a tool for dissent, such as resmigaste.com (‘resmi gazete’ means ‘official journal’ in Turkish) and zaytung.com. The language used in these websites is an exaggerated, cynical and twisted form of formal journalistic language. The subjects of parody news presented in these sites are inspired from statements of politicians, celebrities’ lives or other developments on the agenda of the public. One example of them

[17] http://americanpressassociation.com/principles-of-journalism/, (Accessed: July 2017)

is ‘The Plaque of Appreciation from the Ministry of Interior to 47 Syrians for keeping 'Migrant Hate' alive which become one of the most common values in Turkey. In an increasingly polarized environment, migrant hatred is one of the rare subjects that everyone agrees on. The Ministry of Interior rewarded the 47 Syrian citizens for the contribution they made to our national unity’.[18]

2.1.2.3. Rumors

Fake news has a close connection with rumors. It may be produced based on rumors. According to Sunstein (2014) rumors ‘refer roughly to claims of fact—about people, groups, events, and institutions—that have not been shown to be true, but that move from one person to another, and hence have credibility not because direct evidence is available to support them, but because other people seem to believe them’ (p.4). What is the difference between fake news and rumors is that rumors are likely to be true.

2.1.2.4. Conspiracy Theory

Some fake news items are also based on conspiracy theories. Brian L. Keeley (1999) defines it as ‘a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons the conspirators acting in secret’ (p.116). It is similar to rumors in that it is difficult to verify as true or false.

Oliver & Wood (2014) demonstrate the widespread allure of conspiracy theories in the American public. They observe that conspiracism does not reflect political ignorance. A conspiracy narrative may provide an alternative account of political events. Uscinski et al. (2016) finds that political predispositions such as partisanship and conspiratorial predispositions are effective in believing in a conspiracy theory, as well as informational cues.

Conspiracy theories may claim to reveal a secret plan for the future. For example, one of the conspiracy theory about the Syrian immigrants circulated in Turkey is that they deliberately settle in certain cities in Turkey which are near the southern borders. It is alleged that after receiving citizenship, they will demand lands and independence status from Turkey.[19] This conspiracy theory

[18] http://www.zaytung.com, (Accessed: July 2017)
[19] http://www.internethaber.com/suriyeliler-turkiyeden-toprak-mi-istiyor-764401h.htm, (Accessed: July 2017)

may feed the Turkish people's fears about the division of the country by appealing to nationalist sentiments, instigate prejudices against the Syrians and enhance polarization.

2.1.2.5. Political Spin

Another similar term to fake news is (political) spin. Politicians employ political spin, promise, or distorted information in the political arena. Political spin is defined in the Encyclopædia Britannica as

> in politics, the attempt to control or influence communication in order to deliver one's preferred message… It is used to refer to the sophisticated selling of a specific message that is heavily biased in favor of one's own position and that employs maximum management of the media with the intention of maintaining or exerting control over the situation, often implying deception or manipulation.[20]

In these cases, news outlets are a medium for the false statements of politicians. As James H. Kuklinski and Paul J. Quirk (2000a) state that 'Politicians use rhetoric to trigger the psychological mechanisms that distort judgment. They present isolated, unrepresentative facts; they frame issues tendentiously; and they seek to evoke an emotional response, rather than encourage rational deliberation. The media rarely attempt to sort out a debate in an orderly way' (p.168).

Politicians' lies are not a new fact. As Hannah Arendt (1972) points out that 'truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues, and lies have always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings' (p.4).

In Turkey, politicians both from the ruling party and the opposition parties use political spins about the Syrian immigration issue. Subjects such as the amount of money spent on the Syrian immigrants is on example.

2.1.2.6. Propaganda

All these forms of distorted information or completely false and fabricated stories bring the discussion to a more comprehensive concept: That is Propaganda.

Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman (2002) develop the propaganda model to clarify media practices while handling a topic. In the first edition of the model, they put forward the following

[20] https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-spin, (Accessed: August 2017)

five filters that 'the raw material of news must pass through' (p.2):

(i) The concentrated ownership and profit-orientation of the dominant mass-media firms. A media organization within an existing profit-driven economic system seeks 'to capitalize increased audience and advertising revenue' (p.7). Due to the structural relationship of the media with both corporates in other sectors and governments, they are unlikely to be critical.

(ii) Advertising as primary source of income. The aim of increasing the number of advertisers and audience who are potential consumers of products and services influence media content. As Chomsky and Herman point out, 'large corporate advertisers on television will rarely sponsor programs that engage in serious criticism of corporate activities, such as the problem of environmental degradation, the workings of the military-industrial complex' (p.17).

(iii) The reliance of the media on information provided by government, business, and "experts" funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power. As Chomsky and Herman point out, 'The media may feel obligated to carry extremely dubious stories and mute criticism in order not to offend their sources and disturb a close relationship. It is very difficult to call authorities on whom one depends for daily news liars, even if they tell whoppers' (p.22).

(iv) Flak as a means of disciplining the media. 'Flak' refers to negative reactions and responses to media produced by individuals, groups or governments including boycotts, petitions, lawsuits, complaints or punitive action when the media deviate from 'the established line'.

(v) 'Anti-communism' as a national religion and control mechanism. In the first edition of the propaganda model, the authors emphasized how 'communism opposition' often shapes (especially the content of) foreign policy news. In the revisited edition, Herman added that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, communism has expired as an enemy and threat. However, the discourse 'war on terror' or 'anti-Islam', which emerged in the post-9/11 political conditions reflects the necessity to find a common enemy.

This model provides an explanation for both considering why traditional media come to be seen as unreliable, controlled and biased and to understand how fake news is used as a propaganda

method. First of all, new media differ from traditional media in terms of ownership, control mechanisms, regulation and production of content. Although legacy news media mostly adapt themselves to digital media and to the domination of Facebook and Google that exists in the online environment, the structure of new media ownership is different from what Chomsky and Herman describe for mass media. Everyone with a little technical knowledge can create a website to disseminate fake news. In this sense, these kinds of websites can operate independently of any official source, pressure from stockholders or directors, or from editors. If their only aim is to spread political thoughts without profit maximization, they are also excluded from the second filter.

Irina Khaldarova & Mervi Pantti (2016) examine how Russian mainstream television Channel One deploys fake news to advance the strategic narratives of the government, presenting the Ukrainian crisis to domestic and international audiences. Channel One resorted to contrasts such as 'West versus Russia', selected extreme words to label the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian soldiers such as 'fascist' or 'executioners', and presented a 'sensational image'. Khaldarova and Pantti discuss how the Ukrainian fact-checking website Stopfake.org responds to the Russian propaganda by debunking misinformation and misguiding images about Ukraine (p.891).

2.1.2.7. Misleading Headlines

Misleading headlines give distorted information about the content of an article or a news story. In the online environment, shocking or clickbait headlines are used to make people click on the link to direct them to a main website. Increasing the number of visitors to the page ensures advertising revenue.

Ullrich K. H. Ecker et al. (2014) designed two experiments to investigate readers' reactions to misleading headlines during 'processing of factual news articles and opinion pieces' (p.323). They found that 'misleading headlines affected people's inferential reasoning in opinion articles' (p.332).

In journalism training, it is taught that a headline should summarize the article and show the most important point of the news. The headline gives readers their first impression about an article or

news story. In this sense, a misleading headline can cause misperceptions and misunderstandings that are difficult to rectify later.

2.1.3. Reasons for the Prevalence of Fake News

As stated above, fake news and false statements are not a new phenomenon, however, recently there are some factors which are intertwined that led them to explode in frequency. One of the reasons for it is the profit-driven media ecology and the commodification of communication. In this context, news becomes a commodity to be sold in the communication marketplace. Accordingly, competition and profit maximization motives facilitate the formation of a convenient environment for fake news.

It is relevant to note that, the operating logic of the internet, search engines and social media may well be enabling individuals to create websites publishing fake news to obtain ad revenue. The lack of editorial limitations to maintain fairness and accuracy at a reasonable level facilitates the fabrication and dissemination of fake news. According to BuzzFeed analysis, 'in the final three months of the US presidential campaign, the top-performing fake election news stories on Facebook generated more engagement than the top stories from major news outlets such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Huffington Post, NBC News, and others.'[21] It is fair to say that social media plays a leverage role in the dissemination of fake news stories.

The other reason could be the decline of trust in traditional media. According to Gallup research conducted in 2016, trust in media in the US has fallen.[22] It directs people to seek out alternative news sources.

Polarization is both a consequence of and a reason for the increase of fake news pieces (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006). A BuzzFeed News analysis found that the best way to draw audience' attractions to political content on Facebook is to resort to partisan biases using false or misleading information. This leads the creation of echo chambers and enhances polarization.[23]

[21] https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.ivkNQQkzVr#.eqEJQQE78l, (Accessed: July 2017)
[22] http://www.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx (Accessed: August 2017)
[23] https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/partisan-fb-pages-analysis?utm_term=.yyp2bbwpWM#.kbW0RRJ89z, (Accessed: July 2017)

Another reason for the prevalence of fake news items is the current political system and the condition of individuals in this system. It may be extremely optimistic and illusive to assume that people always seek truth and make rational decisions. As Kuklinski and Quirk (2000a) accept that

> The structures of modern democracy give ordinary citizens almost no incentive to think carefully about politics. Because informed deliberation is a collective good, individuals lack not only the incentive to be well informed, but even the incentive to use their limited information in thoughtful ways. People make political judgments half-consciously, as an incidental part of another activity - such as watching television for entertainment. They employ the error-prone methods of peripheral processing (Cacioppo and Petty 1985). They make little use of their critical faculties, and rarely wonder if their judgments are accurate. (p.168)

Kuklinski et al. (2000b) distinguish uninformed people from misinformed ones and they find it more problematic for people 'to confidently hold wrong beliefs' (p.790). Because replacing misperceptions with corrected information may be more demanding (Swire, B. et al., 2017). Moreover, they may insist on their original opinion even more strongly (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010; Swire, B. et al., 2017).

To understand why people insist on holding onto misperceptions, scholars look at their reasoning process (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Flynn, Nyhan & Reifler, 2017; Fridkin, K. et al., 2015; Swire, B. et al., 2017; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Charles S. Taber and Milton Lodge (2006) argue that 'all reasoning is motivated' (p.756). When citizens process information, two motives are activated. They are accuracy goals which 'motivate them to seek out and carefully consider relevant evidence so as to reach a correct or otherwise best conclusion' (ibid.) and directional goals which try to reach a desired conclusion. In the political context, for instance, when citizens encounter an argument in the news, they interpret it depending on their backgrounds, identities and predispositions such as partisanship, ideology, sophistication, and prior issue opinions (Flynn, Nyhan & Reifler, 2017). This indicates that citizens are often unable to eliminate their strong prior attitudes, beliefs and biases in processing of new information. If a new piece of information or argument confirms their attitudes, people are not tended to investigate its accuracy, which as Taber and Lodge call the 'disconfirmation bias'. On the other hand, if new information contradicts their beliefs, they approach it suspiciously

and seek out evidence to justify themselves in order to eliminate inconsistency instead of updating their stance. (Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000a, 172). In that case which is 'motivated skepticism' the 'confirmation bias' is stimulated (Taber and Lodge, 2006).

James H. Kuklinski and Paul J. Quirk (2000a) describe differences in political scientists' thought on the American citizenry. They suggest that 'even an uninformed citizen can participate in politics competently'. Citizens can 'make fairly reliable political judgments by using heuristics - mental shortcuts that require hardly any information' (p.153). For example, they can draw inferences about a political character by looking at his/her demographics. According to the authors, people use their heuristics 'unknowingly and automatically, and rarely worry about their accuracy' (ibid., p.156). Citizens deploy generalization, similarity, likability or simplification to fill in missing information. In doing so, they compensate for the lack of information.

2.1.4. Fact-checking as a Way of Struggling Against Fake News

Although social media platforms, Facebook in particular, eschew accepting the role of fake news in engendering political implications during the US Presidential Election at first,[24] as a result of critics, it has to take some measures 'to respond to reports of abuse, detect and remove spam, identify and eliminate fake accounts, and prevent accounts from being compromised'.[25] These applications include users' reports about hoaxes (a testing project), and reduction of financial incentives of fake news sites.[26]

Google also announced that it is 'working on a policy update to ensure its advertising network doesn't serve ads on fake news sites'.[27] Google intends to extend its policy prohibiting misleading advertisements from its system to cover websites publishing misrepresentative content.[28]

[24] https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/10/facebook-fake-news-us-election-mark-zuckerberg-donald-trump, (Accessed: July 2017)
[25] https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-security/improvements-in-protecting-the-integrity-of-activity-on-facebook/10154323366590766/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[26] https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/news-feed-fyi-addressing-hoaxes-and-fake-news/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[27] http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebook-google-crack-down-fake-news-advertising-n684101, (Accessed: July 2017)
[28] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/google-will-ban-websites-that-host-fake-news-from-using-its-ad-service.html?_r=0, (Accessed: July 2017)

Despite these attempts, editorial control over fake news in social media platforms is a contentious issue. According to computer scientists, technical recognition of misinformation and separation of fake and true content are problems that have not yet been resolved.[29] On the other hand, the practice of hiring human editors can be vulnerable to criticisms of not being objective.[30]

Fake news is also a global problem. From Germany to Myanmar[31] it can be observed how fake news caused social and political crisis. Elections and long-standing policy debates that cause polarization provide a conducive environment for the proliferation of fake news (Bell, 2017). To address this, the German government voted the bill giving the authority to impose fines on social networks for distributing fake news, hate speech and other illegal content.[32] However, the EU approached this measure cautiously due to concerns that it could be an interference in the freedom of expression.

When these weaknesses are taken into consideration, the need for suggestions for solutions to be based on the content producer and consumer has emerged.

It is argued that insisting on 'good journalism' can vitiate the strength of fake news (Rutenberg, 2016; Jarvis, 2016; Trewinnard, 2016; Sheikh, 2016). Jim Rutenberg supports his argument by giving examples of 'well-reported newspaper articles' that cause huge amount of people's engagement in the online environment.

Alongside these measures, fake news has created its antithesis in a sense. This is fact-checking. Fact-checking was originally promoted at the Washington Post by David Broder, a veteran political writer. The first fact-checking website, FactCheck.org, was launched in 2003, PolitiFact, created by the St. Petersburg Times' and the Washington Post's Fact Checker, followed it. During the 2012 US Presidential Election, the fact-checking concept exploded (Fridkin, Kenney &

[29] https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/can-facebook-trending-fight-off-fake-news?utm_term=.ltzlzzw1A5#.ygLpwwQolM, (Accessed: August 2017)
[30] https://gizmodo.com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006, (Accessed: August 2017)
[31] https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/dec/02/fake-news-facebook-us-election-around-the-world, (Accessed: July 2017)
[32] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-fake-news-social-networks-fine-facebook-50-million-euros-illegal-content-hate-speech-angela-a7668731.html, (Accessed: July 2017)

Wintersieck, 2015).

There are both fact-checking departments of print-born and digital-born news outlets and independent fact-checking websites to debunk both published news or politicians' statements. The former is categorized as the 'Newsroom Model' and the latter as the 'Independent NGO Model' in the Report of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (Graves & Cherubini, 2016). According to the report, the first regular source of political fact-checking in Europe is Channel 4's parliamentary election blog in the UK, launched in 2005. In '2008 similar efforts appeared in France and the Netherlands, and by the end of 2010 fact-checkers were active in ten countries. In all, more than 50 dedicated fact-checking outlets have launched across Europe over the past decade, though roughly a third of those have closed their doors or operate only occasionally'.[33] While many fact-checkers interviewed for the report identify themselves as journalists, others see themselves as activists or experts.[34] They expressed their intention as providing objective information to citizens and holding politicians accountable.

Increasing importance of fact-checking led researchers and scholars to investigate its effects. While some studies find the failure of corrections to misinformation (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010; Swire B. et al., 2017), there are various studies that explore modest but positive effects.

Fridkin, Kenney, and Wintersieck (2015) find that 'fact-checks influence people's assessments of the accuracy, usefulness, and tone of negative political ads. Furthermore, sophisticated citizens and citizens with low tolerance for negative campaigning are most responsive to fact-checks' (p.127).

Nyhan and Reifler (2015) find that fact-checking can reduce inaccuracy when it poses a salient threat for political elites if the electoral and reputational risks of having questionable statements exposed by fact-checkers.

[33] http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/publication/rise-fact-checking-sites-europe, (Accessed: July 2017)
[34] http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/rise-fact-checker-–-new-democratic-institution, (Accessed: July 2017)

2.2. The Immigration Issue in Turkey

The civil war in Syria causes the humanitarian crisis affecting the entire region. Since the outbreak of the civil war in March 2011, an estimated 11 million Syrians have been displaced from their homes. 4.8 million have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, and 6.6 million are internally displaced within Syria.[35]

For reasons such as border proximity, historical-cultural and religious similarities, and the Turkish government's open border policy, the Syrians have chosen to settle in Turkey. Initially, they were settled in accommodation centers which are mostly in cities near the Turkey-Syria border. As of 13.07.2017, there are 23 accommodation centers in 10 provinces. According to the data of the Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management in Turkey, 2,845,182 out of 3,088,061 Syrians stay outside of camps. 81 cities of Turkey accommodate the Syrian immigrants.[36]

The Syrians living in Turkey are subjected to the Temporary Protection (TP) regime. According to the by-law issued on 22 October 2014, health care, education, access to labor market, social aid and translation services are provided for people under Temporary Protection. They are also under protection against forcible return and their duration of stay depends on the decision of the Council of Ministers, in other words, there is no fixed time for the Syrians to stay in Turkey.

In immigration terminology, there are different concepts such as 'refugee' or 'asylum-seeker' to define people who leave their native country to move to another. In awareness of special legal status of the Syrians in Turkey, it is preferred to use 'immigrant' as a comprehensive word in this dissertation.

The Syrian children of school age who are living in camps are able to receive formal education, whereas the problem of educating children outside the camps is not yet completely resolved. Some of them attend state schools, temporary education centers or private schools operated by the Syrians. The Turkish authorities consider that the Syrians will stay for a long time and some

[35] http://syrianrefugees.eu, (Accessed: July 2017)
[36] http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik, (Accessed: July 2017)

of them may not turn to their country even after the war. For this reason, the Government endeavors to normalize their lives and not leave them deprived of education.

It can sometimes be seen that the Syrians who have to work for low wage rates were exploited. On the other hand, the Turkish workers accuse the Syrians of taking their jobs from their hands because they accept to work at low wage rates (ORSAM &TESEV, 2015, p.17). Another problem for the Syrians in earning money in Turkey is that they cannot practice their profession in fields such as education, medicine and law because there is no validity of their license diplomas in Turkey.

The Turkish government provides financial support to pay housing rent for the Syrians living outside the camps, and the Syrian immigrants can access health care services free of charge.

Both the Turkish government[37] and NGOs[38] have conducted various projects to facilitate Syrians' integration into society, and for their rehabilitation.

2.2.1. Conflicts Between the Syrians and the Turkish People

Turkey is a host country for almost 3 million Syrians. Inevitably, such a massive migration has influences on society. In the report prepared by the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) (2015) these influences were categorized in terms of social, economic, political, security, and public services issues. These impacts have been observable especially in border cities in Turkey.

According to the report, the increase in polygamy, abuse of women and children, social and sectarian polarization and urban sprawl can be ordered as effects in social life.

In economic life, an increase in rental prices and living costs in general, the use of Syrian workers as illegal, cheap labor can be considered as the main problems.

As stated in the report that political views may be decisive in enabling the Turkish people to approach the Syrians in a more tolerant manner or in reacting negatively to the issue of refugees. Due

[37] http://www.gsb.gov.tr/HaberDetaylari/1/53033/suriyeli-gencler-genclik-ve-spor-bakanliginin-destegiyle-hayata-tutunuyor.aspx, (Accessed: July 2017)
http://www.gap.gov.tr/gecici-koruma-altindaki-suriyelilere-yonelik-projeler-sayfa-129.html, (Accessed: August 2017)
[38] http://multeciler.org.tr/eng/, (Accessed: July 2017)
http://en.sgdd.info/?cat=38, (Accessed: July 2017)
http://imprhumanitarian.org/en/category/our-projects/ongoing-projects/, (Accessed: July 2017)

to conflicts between the Syrians and the Turkish people, the Syrians feel the necessity to organize themselves to provide for their own security. It leads to an increase in polarization between the locals and the immigrants.

The rapid change in demographics and constant flow of people across the border cities cause security concerns for locals. In the report, locals expressed that they feel defenseless to terrorist attacks and as a minority in their home-town. They also worry that living under unfavorable conditions renders the Syrians vulnerable to getting involved in criminal and violent acts and the youth growing up in poverty can be easily motivated to commit crime in the future.

In terms of public services, capacity problems have emerged in state hospitals with the addition of the Syrian patients. According to records, 'some diseases such as polio, which was eliminated in Turkey many years ago, have been newly detected. In addition, Gaziantep reported the highest rates of measles in Turkey in 2013' (ibid., p.20).

When the Syrians begun to live outside the accommodation centers, they came into contact with Turkish citizens and the conflicts between the two have become visible in the news.

As reported on 05.07.2017, in Gaziantep, 3 Turkish citizens were injured in a fight between the Syrian and the Turkish families due to 'unknown reasons'. During the fight, two workplaces and cars belonging to Syrians were damaged. The Syrian family was evacuated from that neighborhood.[39]

On 04.07.2017, in Ankara, a fight between the Syrians and Turkish citizens was reported. The police had to use pepper gas to disperse people. It was stated that one person was injured and some workplaces were damaged.[40]

On 08.04.2017, in İzmir, a claim that the Syrians attacked a child caused tension. 30 people were hurt, the Syrian group of 500 people left the neighborhood.[41]

[39] http://www.posta.com.tr/gaziantep-te-suriyeli-ve-turk-iki-aile-arasinda-kavga-3-yarali-haberi-1311937, (Accessed: July 2017)
[40] https://www.haberler.com/ankara-demetevler-de-suriyeli-gerginligi-halk-9792088-haberi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[41] https://www.haberler.com/izmir-suriyeliler-kavga-sonrasi-mahalleyi-terk-9474899-haberi/, (Accessed: July 2017)

On 12.09.2016, in Gaziantep, the Syrians were uprooted because of the claim that they harassed a woman. While 4 Syrians were being beaten, the Syrian family of 8 people was evacuated from the area.[42]

On 14.07.2014, in Kahramanmaraş, about a thousand people organized on social media and took to the streets to hold a rally against the Syrians. There was tension between the police and the group demanding that the Syrians are sent back to their countries. 2 police injured.[43]

The most severe event occurred in August in Sakarya province. A pregnant Syrian woman with a 10-month old child was killed after being raped. It was reported that the suspects were their neighbors.[44]

The presence of polarization between the Syrian immigrants and Turkish citizens in Turkey is observable from all these examples.

2.2.2. Studies Exploring Negative Attitudes of the Turkish People towards the Syrians Immigrants

According to a survey named 'Turkish Public Opinion Towards the Syrian Immigrants' conducted by EDAM (Economy and Foreign Policy Research Center) in November 2013 through TNS (a research company) in Turkey, there is a consensus in Turkish public opinion on the termination of acceptance of asylum seekers from Syria. There are also significant differences between political parties in approaching the issue. Voters who participated in the survey who thought that the number of immigrants should be limited were for the AKP (the ruling party) (%37,3); the opposition CHP (%45,8) and the MHP (%47,8).[45]

'Syrians in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research' of Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Center conducted in October 2014 (Erdoğan, 2014) indicates that although there are negative effects and risks directly experienced in the daily life of Turkish citizens,

[42] https://www.haberler.com/gaziantep-te-suriyeli-gerginligi-4-yarali-8774452-haberi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[43] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/kahramanmarasta-suriyelileri-istemiyoruz-yuruyusunde-olaylar-cikti-26800668, (Accessed: July 2017)
[44] http://www.internethaber.com/sakaryada-suriyeli-kadin-ve-cocugu-vahsice-katledildi-1791011h.htm, (Accessed: August 2017)
[45] http://www.edam.org.tr/tr/IcerikFiles?id=12, (Accessed: July 2017)

social acceptance of Turkish society towards the Syrians is profoundly high. According to the research, the idea that "They should be sent back home even though the war is ongoing" is fiercely opposed among the Turkish people. Moreover, instead of themes such as "religious fraternity" or "neighborhood", the primary mentality behind Turkish support is "to support those who escape from tyranny" (p.49). The most prominent objection of Turkish society is 'the conferment of citizenship upon the Syrians'(ibid.). According to the survey, it is a common concern that the Syrians took the jobs of local people particularly within the cities of the border region. Turkish citizens view the Syrians as an economic burden for Turkey. In terms of political preferences, results are similar with EDAM's (2013) research. Respondents who support the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Peace and Democracy Party-People's Democratic Party (then BDP-HDP) have positive attitudes towards the Syrians in comparison to the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).[46]

In his article 'Turkey's Unexpected Guests: Foreign Immigrants and Refugees Experience in the Context of "Other"', Serdar ÜNAL (2014) examines the comments of internet users on news with the theme "tension with the Syrians" in the most visited news websites in Turkey. He finds that the comments reflect concerns on security and order. The people who left comments below the news describe the Syrians as a 'potentially dangerous group'. Ünal also observes that discriminative, exclusionary and otherizing discourses stemming from the unwillingness of sharing economic resources and ethnic difference are used in comments.[47]

According to the data of 'the Report of Transatlantic Trends: Mobility, Migration and Integration' (2014), in Turkey, the rate of respondents who 'saw emigration as a problem' is 75%, (up 29 percentage points from 2013) (p.11). 55% of respondents have a perception that 'immigrants are a threat to national culture' (p.26). Researchers asked the respondents whether they approved of their own government's handling of immigration from other countries, 67% of Turkish disapproved

[46] http://fs.hacettepe.edu.tr/hugo/dosyalar/TurkiyedekiSuriyeliler-Syrians%20in%20Turkey-Rapor-TR-EN-19022015.pdf, (Accessed: July 2017)
[47] http://dieweltdertuerken.org/index.php/ZfWT/article/viewFile/643/643, (Accessed: July 2017)

(p.5). Two-in-three Turks (66%) favored more restrictive refugee policies; seventy-seven percent were worried about refugees (p.8).

According to the evaluation report of the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) based on the comparison of the results of 2009 and 2015 of 'the Survey on Quality of Life in Cities' of European Union, the rate of the respondents who say 'I completely disagree' to the question "Is the presence of foreigners good for the city?" increases from 14,8% (2009) to 34% (2015) in Istanbul and from 19,7% (2009) to 35% (2015) in Ankara. In the report, this dramatic change is considered the effect of the Syrian immigrants (Düşündere and Çilingir, 2017).

According to another research titled 'Attitudes and perceptions towards the Syrian Immigrants' (Kavakli, 2016) conducted by Istanbul Kemerburgaz University and University of Kent (United Kingdom), the percentage of those who stated that they were having difficulty in finding jobs due to refugees accounted for 91%. 65% think that the Syrians affect Turkish culture negatively. The percentage of those saying that the Syrians are increasing crime rates is 86. In terms of feelings about the Syrians, 76% of the people do not feel sympathy, 49% feel pity, 18% are afraid, 14% are disgusted and 12% are hated.

CHAPTER III

3.1. Method

Within the scope of this dissertation, an online survey in Turkish was conducted for 286 Turkish adults aged 18 and over using the SurveyMonkey platform from 19.06.2017 to 02.08.2017 (The survey can be accessed at https://tr.surveymonkey.com/r/TQJZQ5T). 66 of them left the questionnaire uncompleted. 67 of them have not responded to most of the questions in IV. Section. Finally, 153 participants remained to be evaluated.

The survey consisted of four sections. In the first section, demographic questions were asked to participants including gender, age, education level, religious beliefs, ethnic identity, political identity.

The aim of the questions in the second section is to learn respondents' general approach on the migration issue and the Syrian immigrants, in particular.

In the third section, two questions were asked to learn respondents' main source for news and how much time they spend on getting news in a day.

In the last section, 12 news reports on Syrian immigrants living in Turkey were shown to participants to understand their tendencies to believe the news on Syrian immigrants. Each news item was given with a question set consisting of the same 5 questions. These questions include whether they recall the news, if they recall where they saw it, whether they confirmed the news, if so, how they confirmed, and finally, their thoughts about the accuracy of the news.

4 out of 12 news pieces are true, the rest are fabricated headlines. These news articles are about social or economic assistance or exemptions granted to the Syrians. They were presented in social media, on the internet and traditional media, which have been on the agenda for a long time. Local and instant rumors causing local conflicts as given in the examples above were excluded because they could not be verifiable. The reason for putting the right news into the survey is not to

direct the participants to one particular view and to see whether they distinguish between true news and fake news.

Two independent fact-checking sites were used to verify the news. One is teyit.org which fact-checks rumors, suspicious information and assertions presented in social media or on traditional media. It is a signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network and a First Draft Network partner.

The other website is dogrulukpayi.com launched by a group of political science graduates as a civil society initiative, which mainly focuses on statements and claims of politicians; however, they prepared a special bulletin[48] to fact-check the news on Syrian immigrants. Similar to teyit.org, it is not affiliated with any political party in Turkey and it is a signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network.

Main research questions and hypotheses of this study to be examined are as follows:

1. Where are the individuals exposed to fake news more often?

   Hypothesis 1: Individuals are exposed to fake news in social media more often.

2. Do individuals investigate the accuracy of news about the Syrian immigrants that they encounter on the internet?

   Hypothesis 2: Individuals are not inclined to verify the authenticity of news about the Syrian immigrants on the Internet. Fact-checking sites are not commonly known among participants.

3. Do Turkish citizens believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants?

   Hypothesis 3: Turkish citizens are inclined to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants.

4. What are the factors that affect the beliefs of individuals in fake news?

   Hypothesis 4a: Older people tend to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants more.

   Hypothesis 4b: People having a higher education level have a lower tendency to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants.

   Hypothesis 4c: People who associated themselves with the AK Party, which is the ruling party, and the HDP tend to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants less.

[48] http://www.dogrulukpayi.com/bulten/5785f4a007857, (Accessed: July 2017)

Hypothesis 4d: Participants who agree with the statement that immigration is a threat for Turkey tend to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants more.

The answers for the last section questions were evaluated on a question-based due to the fact that questions consist of both true and false headlines. Additionally, participants' reactions to each question may change according to the subject of headline, it was understood that evaluating all the answers collectively has the potential to direct erroneous interpretation.

To analyze the responses and to compare different variables the filter function of the SurveyMonkey platform was used.

3.2. Participants

Respondents of the survey consist of 92 women (60%), 60 men (39.2%). 1 (0.6%) individual marked the sex choice as other. Participants' ages were reported as 18-34 (28.7%), 35-51 (55.5%), 52 and over (15.6%).

In terms of education level, most of the participants were well educated, with 61,4% of them having a four-year college/university degree, 25.9% having a Master's/Doctoral degree, 12.4% having high school and only 1 individual (0.6%) having less than high school education.

In terms of religious identity, the majority of the participants declared themselves as Sunni (59.2%), which is a denomination of Islam, and Alevi (10.5%), which is a different interpretation of Islam. The respondents who expressed their religious identity as Atheist compose the second largest group with 12.5%, and Agnostic is 7.2%.

84.7% of respondents categorizes their ethnic identity as Turk, with Laz 6.6%. Kurd (1.3%), Albanian (0.6%) and Georgian (0.6%) made up the rest of the sample.

Table 1a: Demographic variables

Variables		***N***	***%***
Gender	Female	92	60.13
	Male	60	39.22
	Other	1	0.65
Age	18-34	44	28.76
	35-51	85	55.56
	52+	24	15.69
Education	Primary school	0	0.00
	Secondary school	1	0.65
	High school	19	12.42
	College/University	94	61.44
	Master's/Doctoral degree	39	25.49
Religious identity	Sunni	90	59.21
	Alevi	16	10.53
	Christian	1	0.66
	Jewish	0	0.00
	Agnostic	11	7.24
	Atheist	19	1.50
	Other*	15	9.87
	Missing	1	
Ethnic identity	Turk	128	84.77
	Kurd	2	1.32
	Circassian	0	0.00
	Bosnian	0	0.00
	Albanian	1	0.66
	Georgian	1	0.66
	Arab	0	0.00
	Laz	10	6.62
	Other**	9	5.96
	Missing	2	

Note. *The 'other' category refers to Muslim and Deist.
**The 'other' category refers to Azeri, which is a Turkic ethnic group, and to a combination of different ethnic groups.

In terms of political party preference, 53% of the respondents declared that they vote for CHP (Republican People's Party), which is the main opposition party, 19.7% voted for AKP or AK Party (Justice and Development Party), which is the ruling party, 10.8% voted for HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party), which is the leftist pro-minority, mainly pro-Kurdish party, 6.8% voted for MHP

(Nationalist Movement Party), which the nationalist party in the last parliamentary election held in November 2015.

Table 1b: Demographic variables

Variables		***N***	***%***
Political parties voted for	AK Party	29	19.73
	CHP	78	53.06
	HDP	16	10.88
	MHP	10	6.80
	Independents	4	2.72
	Indecisive	7	4.76
	Other	3	2.04
	Missing	6	
Political identity	Social democrat	61	40.13
	Kemalist	50	32.89
	Liberal democrat	11	7.24
	Nationalist	31	20.39
	Secular	51	33.55
	Socialist	29	19.08
	Muslim democrat	0	0.00
	Conservative democrat	13	8.55
	Political Islam	5	3.29
	Anarchist	6	3.95
	Communist	8	5.26
	Other	4	2.63
	Missing	1	

To analyze the political identities of the participants in accordance with their party preferences a filter function of the SurveyMonkey platform was used. In the relevant question (Q8), more than one option is allowed to be marked. According to the results, participants who voted for CHP describe

themselves mostly as social democrats (55.1%), as Kemalist[49] (51.2%) and as secular (42.3%). Participants who voted for AKP indicated being conservative democrat as well as nationalist with the same rate (41.3%). While HDP voters covered by this survey stated their political identity as socialist (43.7%) and communist (31.2%), MHP voters as nationalist (60. %) and as secular (40.%) (As seen on Appendix B).

[49] Kemalism is the founding ideology of Turkey developed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who is the founder of Republic of Turkey. It is generally defined as combination of six principles which are republicanism, nationalism, revolutionism, popularism, statism, and secularism.

CHAPTER IV

4.1. Results and Discussions

To understand the Turkish citizens' points of views about immigration issue and Syrian immigrants, 3 different questions were asked to respondents in II.Section.

'To what extent do you agree that immigration is a threat for Turkey?' was given with a 5-point Likert scale for the first question. As seen on Table 2, the majority of participants (73.03%) perceive immigration as a threat.

Table 2: Perception of immigration as a threat

	N	%
Definitely agree	76	50.00
Agree	35	23.03
Neither agree nor disagree	21	13.82
Disagree	16	10.53
Definitely disagree	4	2.63
Missing	1	

On the other hand, 78.29% of respondents disagreed with the idea that immigration is an opportunity for Turkey.

Table 3: Perception of immigration as an opportunity

	N	%
Definitely agree	2	1.35
Agree	7	4.61
Neither agree nor disagree	24	15.79
Disagree	66	43.42
Definitely disagree	53	34.87
Missing	1	

In order to view attitudes toward Syrian immigrants, a set of emotional concepts consisting of 6 negative, 6 positive and 1 neutral were given to participants. The majority of these concepts were

originally used in ‘negative out-group effect scale’ (Stephan et al., 1998). In their scale, ‘12 distinct evaluative or emotional reactions’ were designed to measure respondents’ prejudicial attitudes ‘toward immigrants on a 10-point scale running from 0=*no… at all* to 9=*extreme*….’ (ibid., p.564). This scale was also used in Ezgi Karaoglu’s (2015) master thesis examining psychological factors affecting attitudes against Syrian immigrants in Turkey. As the main aim of this survey is not to measure attitudes in detail, the scale was simplified and reviewed. For this survey, participants were asked to indicate which emotion comes closest to their opinion about Syrian refugees.

As seen on Table 4, participants mostly feel dislike (28.1%) towards the Syrian immigrants; however, the second most frequently chosen feeling is compassion (22.8%). For this question, the interesting point is that the number of ‘other’ responses is high (13.4%). Respondents stated their feelings as upset, pity, mercy, and some of them evaluated the Syrians as dangerous. Some respondents expressed their feeling with statements such as ‘They are more valuable than Turkish people’, ‘Syrian women and children must live in certain places, men must go to Syria to fight’, or ‘Turkey should never have interfered with the internal affairs of Syria. The Syrians should have defended their homeland and not escaped. In our own country, they humiliate us. They threaten our lives. This is called hostility. We cannot take advantage of the opportunities which are provided to them. So, I hate those who provide these opportunities and the Syrians who are ungrateful. Except for innocent children’.

Table 4: Feelings towards the Syrian Immigrants

	N	%
Hostility	1	0.67
Admiration	0	0.00
Dislike	42	28.19
Acceptance	5	3.36
Superiority	0	0.00
Affection	6	4.03
Disdain	1	0.67
Approval	2	1.34
Hatred	3	2.01
Sympathy	4	2.68
Ostracism	2	1.34
Compassion	34	22.82
Indifference	29	19.46
Other	20	13.42
Missing	4	

When it comes to the third section, 37.5% of the respondents stated that their main source for getting news is social media. Website follows it with 28.2%. The third most used news source is TV with 23.%. This finding is consistent with suggestions of the Digital News Report 2016 by University of Oxford Reuters Institute indicating the popularity of online sources in Turkey for accessing news.[50]

In terms of their news consumption, the majority of participants (77.3%) spend relatively significant amounts of time on getting news per day.

[50] http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2016/sources-of-news-2016/, (Accessed: July 2017)

Table 5: Main Source and Time Spent for News

Variables		N	%
Main Source for News	TV	35	23.03
	Radio	0	0.00
	Print	13	8.55
	Website	43	28.29
	Social media	57	37.50
	Other	4	2.63
	Missing	1	
Time spent on news	None	4	2.84
	less than 1 hour	19	13.48
	1-3 hours	109	77.30
	more than 3 hours	10	7.09
	Missing	12	

In the fourth section, 12 news headlines on Syrian immigrants living in Turkey were shown to participants to understand their tendency to believe. For each headline, the same question set consisting of 5 items was used.

The headlines are as follows:

1. **'Syrian refugees are entering universities in Turkey without examination.'**.[51]

This news headline can be categorized as a misleading headline. It may stem from a statement of the then prime minister in a television interview in 2014.[52] The Council of Higher Education make various arrangements so that the Syrian students can continue their education in Turkey. The first option for the Syrian students is to study in a Turkish university as an international student. In this situation, they are subjected to the same procedure as any foreign student. It requires either a certain grade point average or passing of an exam. The second option for the Syrian students is that they can get certain courses which they missed in their own countries if they are registered in a Syrian

[51] http://www.sabah.com.tr/egitim/2013/10/24/suriyeli-siginmaci-genclere-universiteye-sinavsiz-girme-hakki, (Accessed: July 2017)
http://archive.is/LFgdw, (Accessed: July 2017)
http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/egitim/bosa-kasmayin-gencler-suriyeli-degilsiniz-1134014/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[52] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xP2jcvn8PaA, (Accessed: July 2017)

university. Additionally, in 2015, the Council of Higher Education decided to open programmes for the Syrian students at 8 universities. In these universities, 1707 students continue to study. In conclusion, it does not mean that every Syrian student can get into any university unconditionally. However, it continues to be used for propaganda arguments by politicians.[53] This news was collected from the teyit.org fact-checking site.[54]

2. **'TOKI's houses will be given free of charge to Syrians'**.[55]

The Housing Development Administration (TOKİ) is an official institution of Turkey dealing with housing and settlement issues for low and middle-income people. This news also stems from the statements of politicians.[56] As a matter of fact, TOKİ's houses will be sold with proper payment options according to the fact-checking of dogrulukpayi.com.[57]

3. **'Syrians will not pay Motor Vehicle Tax.'**[58]

This headline reflects true information based on a regulation dated March 2016. It was also selected from dogrulukpayi.com.[59]

4. **'Syrian refugees benefit from in-vitro fertilization treatment free of charge.'**[60]

Although the majority of the Syrian immigrants living outside the camps can access to free health services in public hospitals, it does not include in-vitro fertilization treatment. This news report was also presented on a TV channel. It was collected from the teyit.org fact-checking site.[61]

5. **'Konya Metropolitan Municipality paid salaries to Syrian people.'**[62]

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[53] https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201703151027652860-ince-suriyeliler-sinavsiz-okula-girecek-suriyede-bizim-evlatlarimiz-sehit-dusecek/, (Accessed: July 2017)
'The Syrians will go to universities without examination, our children in Syria will be martyred.'

[54] https://teyit.org/suriyeliler-universiteye-kosulsuz-sinavsiz-girebiliyor-iddiasi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[55] http://www.memurhaber.com/suriyelilere-bedava-toki-konutu-verilecek-1610161h.htm, (Accessed: July 2017)
[56] https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201607121023792688-toki-baskani-suriyeliler-konut/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[57] http://www.dogrulukpayi.com/bulten/5785f4a007857, (Accessed: July 2017)
[58] http://www.urfaflash.com/mobil/haber/6904/suriyelilere-beles-vatandaslara-parali.html, (Accessed: July 2017)
[59] http://www.dogrulukpayi.com/bulten/5785f4a007857, (Accessed: July 2017)
[60] http://t24.com.tr/haber/suriyeli-gocmenlerin-tup-bebek-tedavisini-sgk-oduyor-iddiasina-aciklama,387316, (Accessed: July 2017)
[61] https://teyit.org/suriyelilerin-tup-bebek-tedavisinden-ucretsiz-yararlandigi-iddiasi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[62] http://archive.is/ULTZc, (Accessed: July 2017)

This fake news report was presented with a photo as 'evidence'. According to verification done by teyit.org,[63] the municipality did not pay salaries to the Syrians as it was alleged, and this queue is for the 'social card' which provides aid for food, clothing, etc. for both Turkish citizens and the Syrian immigrants.

6. 'The Syrians were registered at the residence address of a Turkish citizen in Batman.'[64]

This news is also based on true information; however, according to clarification made by the governorship, this incident occurred due to a mistake in address registration. This news was circulated in the media because it was associated with concerns about both the conferment of citizenship and illegal voting of the Syrians. Visual material was used in the news. It was gathered from teyit.org.[65]

7. 'Syrians enter the queue in front of PTT to get their salaries.'[66]

This fake news report was supported by a photo. It is understood from an announcement of the UN Refugee Agency on its official Facebook page that this queue is not for salaries from the Turkish government but for winter assistance for the Syrian immigrants delivered through PTT (General Directorate of Post and Telegraph Organization) debit card. This headline was selected from teyit.org fact-checking site.[67]

8. 'Syrians entered the queue for Turkish citizenship in Gaziantep.'[68]

In this fake news fact-checked by teyit.org[69], it is alleged that the Syrian immigrants were in a queue in front of a state office for the procedure of conferment of citizenship. In reality, they were in queue to update their address information.

9. 'Provided AK Card for Syrians which provides 50 percent discount on shopping.'[70]

[63] https://teyit.org/konya-buyuksehir-belediyesi-suriyelilere-maas-bagladi-iddiasi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[64] http://gazetekarinca.com/2017/02/batmanli-yurttas-ev-adresine-kayitli-iki-suriyeli-secmen-oldugunu-ogrendi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[65] https://teyit.org/batmanda-bir-vatandasin-ikametgah-adresine-suriyelilerin-kaydedildigi-iddiasi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[66] http://archive.is/POGTF, (Accessed: July 2017)
[67] https://teyit.org/suriyeliler-maaslarini-almak-icin-ptt-onunde-kuyruga-giriyor-iddiasi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[68] https://archive.is/t8OD2, (Accessed: July 2017)
[69] https://teyit.org/gaziantepte-suriyeliler-vatandaslik-icin-kuyruga-girdi-iddiasi/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[70] https://teyit.org/suriyelilere-alisverislerde-yuzde-50-indirim-saglayan-ak-kart-verildi-iddiasi/, (Accessed: July 2017)

According to a message circulating on WhatsApp, a Syrian family got 50% discount shopping with 'AK Card' at Istanbul's IKEA store. The press department of IKEA clarified this issue to teyit.org site that there is no valid card so-called AK Card in any IKEA store.

10. 'Health services free of charge for Syrians.'[71]

This true news story collected from the dogrulukpayi.com fact-checking website.[72]

11. '250 TL rent aid is being made to Syrians.'[73]

This news headline gathered from dogrulukpayi.com[74] is based on true information. Governorships provide rent assistance to the Syrian immigrants living outside the accommodation centers.

12. '1,200 TL scholarship is paid to Syrian undergraduate students'[75]

This headline can also be accepted as a misleading headline. According to the fact-checking of dogrulukpayi.com,[76] the scholarship is only given to students who fulfill certain conditions such as grade point average, and 85% of it is funded by the European Union, it is not fully funded by the Turkish Government.

When it comes to findings, while the most recalled news headline is the first one which is fake news (84.6%), the least remembered news is the fifth one. News headlines were not generally recalled except the first and the tenth headlines.

[71] http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/10/151008_multeciler_saglik, (Accessed: July 2017)
[72] http://www.dogrulukpayi.com/bulten/5785f4a007857, (Accessed: July 2017)
[73] http://www.musovasi.com/haber/suriyelilere_kira_yardimi-13277.html, (Accessed: July 2017)
[74] http://www.dogrulukpayi.com/bulten/5785f4a007857, (Accessed: July 2017)
[75] http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/egitim/suriyeli-universite-ogrencisi-olmak-varmis-1027614/, (Accessed: July 2017)
[76] http://www.dogrulukpayi.com/bulten/5785f4a007857, (Accessed: July 2017)

Table 6: Recall seeing the news

Questions	Yes	%	No	%	Missing
1	127	84.67	23	15.33	3
2	75	49.34	77	50.66	1
3*	29	19.21	122	80.79	2
4	37	24.50	114	75.50	2
5	20	13.33	130	86.67	3
6*	38	25.33	112	74.67	3
7	63	41.72	88	58.28	2
8	51	33.55	101	66.45	1
9	32	21.33	118	78.67	3
10*	113	74.34	39	25.66	1
11*	62	40.79	90	59.21	1
12	46	30.46	105	69.54	2

Note: The numbers with asterisk symbol (*) indicate a true news story.

Hypothesis 1: Individuals are exposed to fake news in social media more often.

In terms of the medium for each news story, many of the participants stated that they read them on social media. This finding verifies hypothesis 1, which predicted that audience or news consumers are exposed to fake news more in social media. As discussed in the first chapter, the internet, and in particular social media, are suitable for fake news producers due to anonymity, the lack of editorial judgments and reputation concerns. Rumors or allegations fabricated by social media accounts cannot be accepted as journalistic activities. According to interviews done by fake news producers, their aim could be to earn money, to play game[77] or to spread propaganda.

[77] http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/11/23/503146770/npr-finds-the-head-of-a-covert-fake-news-operation-in-the-suburbs, (Accessed: August 2017)

Table 7: Medium of fake news seen

Questions	TV	%	Radio	%	Print	%	Website	%	Social media	%	Other	%	Skipped
1	15	11.72	0	0.00	11	8.59	22	17.19	76	59.38	4	3.13	25
2	15	19.48	1	1.30	7	9.09	10	12.99	41	53.25	3	3.90	76
3*	7	21.88	0	0.00	3	9.38	3	9.38	15	46.88	4	12.50	121
4	8	21.05	0	0.00	3	7.89	4	10.53	23	60.53	0	0.00	115
5	1	5.00	0	0.00	4	20.00	0	0.00	14	70.00	1	5.00	133
6*	9	22.50	0	0.00	3	7.50	2	5.00	26	65.00	0	0.00	113
7	18	28.13	0	0.00	4	6.25	11	17.19	26	40.63	5	7.81	89
8	13	23.64	0	0.00	7	12.73	10	18.18	22	40.00	3	5.45	98
9	3	8.57	0	0.00	4	11.43	4	11.43	22	62.86	2	5.71	118
10*	30	27.03	1	0.90	17	15.32	12	10.81	41	36.94	10	9.01	42
11*	11	17.19	1	1.56	5	7.81	9	14.06	28	43.75	10	15.63	89
12	4	8.16	0	0.00	5	10.20	9	18.37	27	55.10	4	8.16	104

Hypothesis 2: Individuals are not inclined to verify the authenticity of news about the Syrian immigrants on the Internet. Fact-checking sites are not commonly known among participants.

In order to examine verification habits, the question of whether they confirmed the accuracy of a news story was asked to participants who stated that they recalled the news. According to their responses, as seen in Table 8, most of the participants did not verify the news. There can be various explanations for this. To verify a news report requires spending more time and investing cognitive effort. If a news story does not meet with their interest areas, people are reluctant to allocate time for verification. Additionally, as stated in the first chapter, it can be explained with the 'motivated skepticism' concept. While when confronted with arguments consistent with their prior attitude, people tend to accept them more readily, in the opposite case, they have the tendency of questioning.

Table 8: Verification percentages

Questions	Yes	%	No	%	Skipped
1	32	24.81	97	75.19	24
2	12	14.63	70	85.37	71
3*	5	13.51	32	86.49	116
4	8	17.02	39	82.98	106
5	3	10.71	25	89.29	125
6*	2	4.44	43	95.56	108
7	26	37.68	43	62.32	84
8	11	18.64	48	81.36	94
9	3	7.14	39	92.86	111
10*	32	29.36	77	70.64	44
11*	14	21.54	51	78.46	88
12	9	18.37	40	81.63	104

For the next question, verification sources were asked, with open-ended questions, to those who stated that they confirmed the accuracy of news. Participants expressed their verification sources as follows:

- TV news
- the internet (from the websites of traditional news outlets, and NGOs working on immigration issues)
- social media
- explanations of politicians
- clarifications of relevant institutions
- people who work at relevant institutions or witness incidents
- direct witness to incidents
- teyit.org as a fact-checking site

It is worth noting that while the vast majority of responses were concentrated in ‘direct witness’ and ‘personal contact with those who experience the incidents’ options, only three participants expressed ‘fact-checking site’ as their confirmation source.

According to this finding, hypothesis 2 predicted that participants generally do not seek sources to verify news, and that the awareness of fact checking sites is not common is valid.

Hypothesis 3: Turkish citizens are inclined to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants.

In terms of tendency to believe the news on the Syrian immigrants, as seen on Table 9, respondents reported for the fifth question of each set that they believe the accuracy of the first, the seventh and the eighth headlines, which are all fake news (the two items which are ‘completely true’ and ‘mostly true’ were summed). While they also correctly believe in the sixth, the tenth and the eleventh headlines that were true, they said mainly ‘mostly false’ (23.9%) and ‘completely false’ (19.18%) for the third headline which is based on true information. They correctly consider that the second, the fourth, the fifth, the ninth, and the twelfth headlines are false (two items which are ‘completely false’ and ‘mostly false’ were summed). It is worth noting that the difference in the rate of those who said (completely and mostly) true and (completely and mostly) false for the second, the seventh, the eighth, and the twelfth headlines is considerably low. Additionally, every headline participants who said ‘partly true, partly false’ make up almost one third.

It is significant to note that when analysing these results, the answers of questions asked about whether the respondents recall seeing the news before and verifying it were also assessed. For example, although most of the participants (84.6%) stated that they recalled seeing the first headline, which is fake, and 24.8% verified it, it does not change the participants’ tendency to believe it. 47.2% expressed they felt it was completely or mostly true, 33.3% ‘partly true, partly false’ and 19.3% completely or mostly false, as seen on Table 9. Similarly, for example, for the seventh headline which is fake news, 41.7% of respondents recall it and it is the most confirmed news (37.6%); however, participants mainly reported it as a true story. Additionally, as stated before, respondents mainly expressed ‘direct witness’ and ‘personal contact’ as their verification sources. The main purpose of

asking this question is to see if participants are aware of fact-checking sites. According to these answers, it cannot be said that fact-checking websites are commonly known.

In conclusion, if four true news headlines are excluded, while for three out of eight fake news participants indicate the tendency to believe, for the other five headlines they reported that they (correctly) did not believe. In terms of hypothesis 3, it cannot be said participants are broadly disposed to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants.

One of the possible explanations of this could be that survey respondents may be conscious about prejudices against the Syrian immigrants in society. As stated in detail in the literature review, there are various researches indicating prejudice against them. As they spend much time on consuming news, it is very likely that they are exposed to news that is reporting conflicts between Turkish citizens and the Syrians. While they know that the Turkish authorities provide access to basic services for the Syrian immigrants, they do not believe every news item reporting 'competition over scarce resources' (Sides and Citrin, 2007, p.1). They may evaluate these kinds of news stories or rumors as provocative.

Table 9: Accuracy perception of news

Qs	Completely true	%	Mostly true	%	Partly true, partly false	%	Mostly false	%	Completely false	%	Missing
1	13	8.67	58	38.67	50	33.33	17	11.33	12	8.00	3
2	12	7.89	35	23.03	52	34.21	32	21.05	21	13.82	1
3*	5	3.42	34	23.29	44	30.14	35	23.97	28	19.18	7
4	8	5.44	24	16.33	43	29.25	38	25.85	34	23.13	6
5	6	4.03	29	19.46	44	29.53	42	28.19	28	18.79	4
6*	13	8.78	50	33.78	37	25.00	27	18.24	21	14.19	5
7	25	16.67	34	22.67	33	22.00	33	22.00	25	16.67	3
8	15	10.14	40	27.03	45	30.41	31	20.95	17	11.49	5
9	6	4.03	26	17.45	45	30.20	36	24.16	36	24.16	4
10*	45	29.80	48	31.79	38	25.17	10	6.62	10	6.62	2
11*	25	16.89	44	29.73	47	31.76	23	15.54	9	6.08	5
12	17	11.49	33	22.30	41	27.70	31	20.95	26	17.57	5

Hypothesis 4a: Older people tend to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants more.

In order to view whether is there a meaningful difference among different age groups to

believe fake news, the answers given by each age group to the fifth question of each set in IV. Section were filtered on the SurveyMonkey platform. According to analysis, as hypothesis 4a predicted, while the responses of 18-34 (Table 10a) and 35-51 (Table 10b) age groups are compatible with the general tendency, adults aged 52 and over (Table 10c) who make up 15.6% of total participants are inclined to believe seven out of eight fake news headlines. It can be explained that the majority of participants in the 'aged 52 and over' group reported that their main source for accessing news is TV (41.6%). They may not be aware of for and against arguments on these news stories on the internet.

Table 10a: 18-34 age group's accuracy perception

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	6.82	29.55	45.45	9.09	9.09
2	2.27	25.00	27.27	22.73	22.73
3	2.50	20.00	35.00	20.00	22.5
4	7.50	7.50	37.50	22.50	25.00
5	2.38	16.67	33.33	26.19	21.43
6	7.14	23.81	28.57	19.05	21.43
7	15.91	18.18	20.45	25.00	20.45
8	6.82	27.27	29.55	20.45	15.91
9	2.27	20.45	20.45	27.27	29.55
10	16.28	34.88	27.91	9.30	11.63
11	14.29	28.57	38.10	11.90	7.14
12	11.90	14.29	23.81	26.19	23.81

Table 10b: 35-51age group's accuracy perception

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	6.02	44.58	27.71	13.25	8.43
2	8.33	17.86	39.29	22.62	11.90
3	3.66	19.51	30.49	26.83	19.51
4	3.53	17.65	22.35	30.59	25.88
5	4.82	20.48	24.10	31.33	19.28
6	11.90	35.71	22.62	19.05	10.71
7	14.46	22.89	21.69	24.10	16.87
8	8.54	24.39	34.15	21.95	10.98
9	3.61	12.05	34.94	24.10	25.30
10	32.14	30.95	25.00	5.95	5.95
11	15.66	25.36	34.94	16.87	7.23
12	8.54	21.95	30.49	21.95	17.07

Table 10c: 52+ age group's accuracy perception

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	21.74	34.78	30.43	8.70	4.35
2	16.67	37.50	29.17	12.50	4.17
3	4.17	41.67	20.83	20.83	12.5
4	9.09	27.27	40.91	13.64	9.09
5	4.17	20.83	41.67	20.83	12.5
6	0.00	45.45	27.27	13.64	13.64
7	26.09	30.43	26.05	8.70	8.70
8	22.73	36.36	18.18	18.18	4.55
9	9.09	31.82	31.82	18.18	9.09
10	45.83	29.17	20.83	4.17	0.00
11	26.09	47.83	8.70	17.39	0.00
12	20.83	37.50	25.00	8.33	8.33

Hypothesis 4b: People having a higher education level have a lower tendency to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants.

Comparing the tendencies to believe the accuracy of news according to education levels, to verify hypothesis 4b, it can be observed that participants having secondary and high school education, who make up 13% of total respondents, reported 'completely true' or 'mostly true' for every news headline. For the fourth headline, the rate of those who say 'true' and 'false' was equal (Table 11a). Respondents having university and post-graduate degrees tend to believe only for the first news headline among eight fake news pieces (Table 11b).

Table 11a: Tendency of participants having secondary and high school education to believe

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	26.32	52.63	0.00	10.53	10.53
2	25.00	25.00	20.00	20.00	10.00
3	15.79	26.32	26.32	5.26	26.32
4	15.79	21.05	26.32	26.32	10.53
5	15.79	31.58	21.05	21.05	10.53
6	20.00	25.00	25.00	20.00	10.00
7	30.00	25.00	15.00	20.00	10.00
8	33.33	27.78	22.22	16.67	0.00
9	10.53	26.32	31.58	10.53	21.05
10	57.89	10.53	15.79	10.53	5.26
11	33.33	22.22	33.33	11.11	0.00
12	26.32	31.58	26.32	15.79	0.00

Table 11b: Tendency of participants having university and post-graduate degree to believe

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	6.11	36.64	38.17	11.45	7.63
2	5.30	22.73	36.36	21.21	14.39
3	1.57	22.83	30.71	26.77	18.11
4	3.91	15.63	29.69	25.78	25.00
5	2.31	17.69	30.77	29.23	20.00
6	7.03	35.16	25.00	17.97	14.84
7	14.62	22.31	23.08	22.31	17.69
8	6.92	26.92	31.54	21.54	13.08
9	3.08	16.15	30.00	26.15	24.62
10	25.76	34.85	26.52	6.06	6.82
11	14.62	30.77	31.54	16.15	6.92
12	9.30	20.93	27.91	21.71	20.26

When looking at the relationship between religious identity and believing fake news on the Syrian immigrants, there is no considerable difference between Sunni and Alevi participants' perception on fake news and their responses are consistent with general results. As a side note, most of the Syrian immigrants in Turkey are Sunni (ORSAM & TESEV, 2015, p.17). On the other hand,

participants who declare themselves as atheist and agnostic think that only the first news report is true (As seen on Appendix C).

Hypothesis 4c: People who associated themselves with the AK Party, which is the ruling party, and the HDP tend to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants less.

When the relationship between perception of the accuracy of news and political party preferences were examined, 'independents', 'indecisive' and 'other' categories were excluded from the analysis. Additionally, these findings will be interpreted with the results of feelings of party voters about the Syrian immigrants.

Survey respondents who voted for the AK Party did not believe fake news except for the first one among eight headlines; however, they incorrectly expressed 'completely false' or 'mostly false' for three out of four true news stories. In this sense, it can be said that AK Party supporters consider that news (true or false) reporting on the advantages given to the Syrians are generally false and they are not likely to correctly identify true or false news (Table 12a). It is worth to note that 51.6% of AK Party voters agree with the statement that immigration is a threat for Turkey. Which is a relatively low rate in comparison with CHP voters (88.3%) and MHP voters (90%). Only 37.5% of HDP voters perceive immigration as a threat (As seen on Appendix D). Additionally, AK Party voters declared having more positive feelings (compassion 41.3%, affection 13.7%) than negative (dislike 10.3%) and neutral (indifference 20%) to the Syrian immigrants (mostly marked emotions percentages against the Syrian immigrants according to party preferences can be seen in Appendix E).

Table 12a: Accuracy perception of AK Party voters

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	7.14	28.57	39.29	14.29	10.71
2	6.90	17.24	31.03	10.34	34.48
3	3.45	10.34	27.59	20.69	37.93
4	3.70	7.41	25.93	25.93	37.04
5	3.45	13.79	24.14	24.14	34.48
6	0.00	17.24	24.14	31.03	27.59
7	3.45	17.24	17.24	20.69	41.38
8	10.71	14.29	28.57	25.00	21.43
9	0.00	10.34	24.14	17.24	48.28
10	14.29	21.43	46.43	0.00	17.86
11	7.14	14.29	35.71	25.00	17.86
12	7.14	14.29	28.57	10.71	39.29

Looking at CHP supporters in this survey, they mainly tend to believe false and true headlines. They reported 'false' only for two headlines which are fake. It apparently cannot be inferred that they were likely to recognize true headlines from false, because their general tendency was to believe the accuracy of news (Table 12b). CHP voters expressed having more negative feelings (dislike 38.1%) than positive (compassion 14.4%) and neutral (22.3%).

Table 12b: Accuracy perception of CHP voters

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	9.21	48.68	30.26	7.89	3.95
2	9.09	27.27	36.36	20.78	6.49
3	4.17	29.17	36.11	18.06	12.50
4	6.67	20.00	36.00	21.33	16.00
5	4.05	24.32	35.14	22.97	13.51
6	12.00	46.67	22.67	10.67	8.00
7	20.78	27.27	29.87	16.88	5.19
8	10.67	37.33	29.33	18.67	4.00
9	6.58	25.00	38.16	18.42	11.84
10	39.74	35.90	16.67	6.41	1.28
11	23.68	35.53	28.95	9.21	2.63
12	17.11	25.00	34.21	18.42	5.26

Respondents who voted for HDP reported all fake headlines as ‘false’. They correctly identified two true headlines as true; however, for the rest of true headlines, they also perceived them as fake news. It can be said that HDP supporters in the survey indicate a tendency not to believe fake news similar to that of AK party voters; however, they were more likely to correctly distinguish true from false headlines (Table 12c). HDP voters stated having more positive feelings (compassion 25%, acceptance 18.7%) than negative (dislike 12.5%) and neutral (12.5%).

Table 12c: Accuracy perception of HDP voters

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	0.00	31.25	12.50	25.00	31.25
2	6.25	12.50	12.50	37.50	31.25
3	6.25	12.50	6.25	43.75	31.25
4	6.25	18.75	6.25	25.00	43.75
5	6.25	6.25	6.25	50.00	31.25
6	18.75	12.50	12.50	25.00	31.25
7	6.25	25.00	0.00	31.25	37.50
8	0.00	25.00	18.75	18.75	37.50
9	0.00	6.25	6.25	25.00	62.50
10	18.75	25.00	18.75	12.50	25.00
11	0.00	43.75	12.50	31.25	12.50
12	0.00	18.75	0.00	25.00	56.25

According to MHP voters, four fake news pieces were perceived as true, three fake news pieces were correctly perceived as false. For one fake news item, the percentage of ‘true’ and ‘false’ are equal (Table 12d). MHP supporters indicate having more negative feelings (dislike 40%) than positive (compassion 20%) and neutral (0%).

Table 12d: Accuracy perception of MHP voters

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	10.00	30.00	50.00	0.00	10.00
2	10.00	30.00	30.00	30.00	0.00
3	0.00	50.00	30.00	0.00	20.00
4	0.00	20.00	30.00	40.00	10.00
5	10.00	30.00	40.00	20.00	0.00
6	11.11	22.22	55.56	11.11	0.00
7	22.22	22.22	22.22	22.22	11.11
8	10.00	20.00	40.00	20.00	10.00
9	10.00	10.00	40.00	30.00	10.00
10	22.22	33.33	33.33	11.11	0.00
11	25.00	25.00	50.00	0.00	0.00
12	12.50	12.50	37.50	25.00	12.50

These findings can be interpreted as meaning that AK party voters generally support their party's policy about the Syrian immigrants. It is fair to say that HDP supporters largely have no negative judgments against the ruling party's policy on the Syrian immigrants issue due to both party politics for minority groups and the approval of Kurdish-origin Syrians immigrants. On the other hand, CHP and MHP generally criticized AK Party policy on the Syrian crisis. Two opposition parties evaluate the influx of immigrants as a consequence of faulty policies of the ruling party.

Hypothesis 4d: Participants who agree with the statement that immigration is a threat for Turkey tend to believe fake news about the Syrian immigrants more.

Filtering participants' responses for those who perceive immigration as a threat (the two items which are 'definitely agree' and 'agree' were summed), it can be clearly seen that they consider that three out of eight fake news items are false (Table 13a). Although respondents who see immigration as an opportunity make up 5.9%, if looking at the answers of those, an opposite tendency is seen. They tended to evaluate three fake news pieces as true (Table 13b). Consequently, it can be suggested that participants' perception on immigration influences their views on the accuracy of the news, as predicted by hypothesis 4d.

Table 13a: Accuracy of perception of those who agree that immigration is a threat

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	11.11	49.07	30.56	7.41	1.85
2	10.91	30.91	38.18	12.73	7.27
3	4.72	32.08	33.96	17.92	11.32
4	7.55	22.64	31.13	19.81	18.87
5	5.56	25.00	35.19	22.22	12.04
6	12.26	42.45	26.42	9.43	9.43
7	23.15	29.63	24.07	12.96	10.19
8	13.08	34.58	31.78	14.02	6.54
9	5.61	24.30	34.58	17.76	17.76
10	37.84	35.14	22.52	3.60	0.90
11	20.37	37.96	30.56	8.33	2.78
12	14.81	27.78	29.63	18.52	9.26

Table 13b: Accuracy of perception of those who agree that Immigration is an opportunity

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	0.00	33.33	44.44	11.11	11.11
2	0.00	44.44	22.22	11.11	22.22
3	0.00	22.22	22.22	44.44	11.11
4	0.00	11.11	33.33	33.33	22.22
5	0.00	33.33	22.22	22.22	22.22
6	0.00	33.33	33.33	22.22	11.11
7	11.11	22.22	11.11	33.33	22.22
8	22.22	33.33	22.22	11.11	11.11
9	0.00	11.11	33.33	22.22	33.33
10	22.22	66.67	0.00	0.00	11.11
11	11.11	11.11	33.33	33.33	11.11
12	11.11	22.22	11.11	33.33	22.22

4.2. Evaluation

In the current study, a detailed survey to understand whether there is bias in the Turkish people against the Syrian immigrants was not conducted. From sharings and comments in social media, news reports presenting conflicts between the Turkish citizens and the Syrian immigrants in news media, public opinion and attitude researches, which were given in the literature review, and finally from daily communications, it was accepted a priori that there is a prejudice against the Syrian immigrants.

Determining and interpreting political, economic, psychological, and sociological reasons behind this negative attitude requires more comprehensive research.

Issues on the Syrian immigrants is always a 'hot' topic, not only for Turkish media but also for international news media. Although various research has been conducted and reports prepared by universities or NGOs in Turkey, there is no investigation about how the Turkish people assessed the fake news about the Syrians.

It was seen in this study that negative perceptions on the immigration issue, and in particular of the Syrian immigrants, do not necessarily motivate people to believe fake news. However, when new developments related to the subject, such as the conferment of citizenship occurred, new surveys are needed. This also offers an opportunity to compare their findings with the results of the present study.

As a final comment, the findings of this study can be used by NGOs, media outlets and authorities for the projects to be developed and for the steps to be taken to avoid the use of discriminatory discourse and to struggle to overcome fake news.

CHAPTER V

5.1. Conclusion

Representation of truth in the media has been widely discussed in literature (Chomsky, 2002; Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006; Herman & Chomsky, 2002). However, in the so-called 'post-truth era', the emergence of the fake news phenomenon makes the discussions go beyond the representation of truth. Completely fabricated stories, baseless allegations and misinformation are circulated on the internet, especially in social media. It is witnessed that fake news production has become an industry, which is more profitable in election periods.

The increasing occurrence of fake news cannot only be explained with individual motives. If political actors are reluctant to provide true information, and the media environment fails to disseminate and present factual information, it directs citizen to alternative information sources regardless of whether they are true or false.

At the beginning, the internet has been valorized due to being an area of unfettered freedom for accessing information and expressing opinions. However, as a result of being a fruitful host for fake news and the role of increased polarization due to its algorithmic logic, the internet and social media have come to reverse its reputation for driving force for democratic debate.[78]

In democratic societies, the importance of being well-informed about political affairs is emphasized to be able to participate effectively in discussion in the public sphere and to make rational decisions. Being an informed citizen is a multi-layered and complicated process. Numerous variables from message source, such as objectivity and impartiality, to individual-level considerations, such as education, political sophistication, and predispositions, have potential to influence the way of thinking and of processing information.

As discussed before, individuals when encountering an (mis)information, evaluate it under the influence of various motivations. While some give an importance to being accurate and rational, others are motivated by internal or external factors such as partisanship, ideology, or group

[78] http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2017/overview-key-findings-2017/, (Accessed: August 2017)

membership. Scholars suggest the ‘motivated reasoning approach’ to explain why people insist on their misperceptions even though they are corrected. In this context, people seek out information verifying their prior attitudes or beliefs to eliminate the feeling of inconsistency. Accordingly, when encountering information that is incompatible with their beliefs, they tend to inquiry rather than believe, even to holding their prior viewpoints more strongly.

The pre-existing prejudices create a favorable environment for fake news. Minorities and different groups have always been used to feed fears. Today, in Turkey, the Syrians have become one of them. The tension created by the likelihood of sharing of resources pinpointed the Syrians as the object of hatred. Rumors, conspiracy theories and fake news feeding negative judgements against the Syrian immigrants have become routine on the internet. As seen in previously given news examples, hate against them has the potential to become extreme violence.

In the present study, Turkish citizens’ perceptions of fake news about the Syrian immigrants are focused on. In order to understand this, a survey was conducted including demographic questions, questions about general evaluation of the immigration issue and news consumption habits. In IV. Section, 12 news headlines gathered from independent fact-checking websites were shown to participants to see their approach to these news. 4 out of 12 news items were based on true information, the rest were fabricated headlines. To provide balance and not direct the participants to a single viewpoint and to see whether they distinguish between real news and fake news, the real news items were also put in the questionnaire.

The main hypothesis of the study is that Turkish citizens are tended to believe fake news pieces about the Syrian immigrants. Age, education level, political attachment, and perception of immigration were viewed as factors that affect the beliefs of individuals in fake news stories. Additionally, it was hypothesized that participants are exposed to fake news more in social media.

Looking at the findings of the survey, participants encounter fake news more in social media and they do not generally use methods of verification.

According to these results, it can be inferred that while participants have an overall awareness

of fake news, it cannot be claimed that they absolutely recognize and never believe fake news. It is also visible that their tendency to identify true news headlines is more accurate.

The general tendency, excluding sub-variables, can be explained by the fact that participants may assess the quality of the news. As they may be aware of bias against the Syrians in society, 'accuracy goals', which direct people to seek out true information, may be activated. They may develop a cognitive resistance.

Four factors should be highlighted. First, older people were overall more likely to believe fake news about Syrian immigrants. Second, lower educated people were more credulous than those having higher education to believe both true and false headlines. Third, AK Party and HDP voters tend more to report the headlines as fake.

Finally, participants who evaluate immigration as a threat are more likely to believe fake news.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Survey Form

Attitudes of Turkish People on News about Syrian Refugees Living in Turkey

Informed Consent Form

This study is being conducted by Bengü Bilgin, a graduate student in Media and Cultural Studies at University of Sussex, under the supervision of Lecturer Dr. Rob Topinka and Prof. Kate Lacey.The aim of the work is to examine the news about Syrian refugees and to determine reactions of Turkish citizens towards these kinds of news reports.With this aim, you will be asked to fill in the questionnaire and to share your views on these issues. Participation in the survey is entirely voluntary. During the survey, any identifying information is not required from you. Your answers will be kept completely confidential and will only be evaluated by researchers. The findings will be used for scientific purposes. In this study, various scales will be given firstly on demographic information and then on news related to Syrian refugees. The questionnaire should take around ten minutes to complete.The questions asked during the study do not contain any details that would cause personal discomfort. There is no right or wrong answer to the questions that are given to you. What is important regarding the reliability of the results of the work is that you sincerely reflect your own thoughts and feelings in your responses. If you feel uncomfortable for any reason during your participation, you can leave the work. Thank you in advance for participating in the survey. The results of the work can be published in scientific journals or presented at scientific meetings. For more information about the study you can contact Bengü Bilgin (e-mail: B.Bilgin@sussex.ac.uk/bngrtn@gmail.com), Dr. Rob Topinka (e-mail: R.Topinka@sussex.ac.uk) and / or Prof. Kate Lacey (K.Lacey@sussex.ac.uk).
*****

Q1- If you agree to participate in the survey, please click 'yes' to start the questionnaire.
Yes
No

I. Section

Q2- Your Gender
Female
Male
Other

Q3- Your age
18-34
35-51
52-

Q4- Your education level
Primary school
Secondary school
High school
College/University
Master's/Doctoral degree

Q5- Which of the following comes closest to your beliefs about religion?
Sunni
Alevi
Christian
Jewish
Agnostic
Atheist
Other (please specify)

Q6- How do you identify your ethnic identity?
Turk
Kurd
Circassian
Bosnian
Albanian
Georgian
Arab
Laz
Other (please specify)

Q7- Which party did you vote for in the last general election?
AK Parti (AKP)
CHP
HDP
MHP
Independents
Indecisive
Other (Please specify)

Q8- Which of the following political identities do you feel closer to yourself? (You can choose more than one option.)
Social democrat
Kemalist
Liberal democrat
Nationalist
Secular
Socialist
Conservative democrat
Political Islam
Anarchist
Communist
Other (please specify)

II. Section

Q9- To what extent do you agree that immigration is a threat for Turkey?
Definitely agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Definitely disagree

Q10- To what extent do you agree that immigration is an opportunity for Turkey?
Definitely agree
Agree
Neither agree nor disagree
Disagree
Definitely disagree

Q11- Which of the following comes closest to your opinion about Syrian refugees?
Hostility
Admiration
Dislike
Acceptance
Superiority
Affection
Disdain
Approval
Hatred
Sympathy
Ostracism
Compassion
Indifference
Other (Please specify)

III. Section

Q12- What is your main source for news?
TV
Radio
Print
Website
Social media
Other (please specify)

Q13- How much time do you spend on reading, watching, listening news in a day?

IV. Section

In this section, you will be asked your opinion about the news on Syrian refugees. If you think that you've seen these news items before, please also answer the next three questions related to the given news. If you do not recall the news, after answering the first question skip to the fifth question which asks your opinion about the accuracy of the news. Please repeat the same process for each news item.

NEWS HEADLINE 1: 'Syrian refugees are entering universities in Turkey without examination.'[79]

Q14-
N1-1: Do you recall seeing before the above mentioned news report? If 'no', skip to question 5

[79] For 12 headlines, the same question set consisting of 5 items was asked.

below.
Yes
No

Q15-
N1-2: If you recall this news, please specify where did you see it.
TV
Radio
Print
Website
Social media
Other (please specify)

Q16-
N1-3: If you recall this news, did you confirm the accuracy of it?
Yes
No

Q17-
N1-4: If 'yes', please state how you confirmed the accuracy in the blank.

Q18-.
N1-5: How accurate do you think this news is?
Completely true
Mostly true
Partly true, partly false
Mostly false
Completely false

NEWS HEADLINE 2: 'TOKI's houses will be given free of charge to Syrians.'

NEWS HEADLINE 3: 'Syrians will not pay Motor Vehicle Tax.'

NEWS HEADLINES 4: 'Syrian refugees benefit from the in vitro fertilization treatment free of charge.'

NEWS HEADLINE 5: 'Konya Metropolitan Municipality paid salaries to Syrian people.'

NEWS HEADLINE 6: 'The Syrians were registered at the residence address of a Turkish citizen in Batman.'

NEWS HEADLINE 7: 'Syrians enter the queue in front of PTT to get their salaries.'

NEWS HEADLINE 8: 'Syrians entered the queue for Turkish citizenship in Gaziantep.'

NEWS HEADLINE 9: 'Provided AK Card for Syrians which provides 50 percent discount on shopping.'

NEWS HEADLINE 10: 'Health services free of charge for Syrians.'

NEWS HEADLINE 11: '250 TL rent aid is being made to Syrians.'

NEWS HEADLINE 12: '1200 TL scholarship is paid to Syrian undergraduate students.'

Appendix B: Political Identities in accordance with Party Preferences

	Political Parties	CHP	%	AKP	%	HDP	%	MHP	%
Political identity	Social democrat	43	55.13	4	13.79	4	25	3	30
	Kemalist	40	51.28	4	13.79	0	0	2	20
	Liberal democrat	4	5.13	3	10.34	0	0	0	0
	Nationalist	7	8.97	12	41.38	1	6.25	6	60
	Secular	33	42.31	5	17.24	2	12.5	4	40
	Socialist	17	21.79	3	10.34	7	43.75	1	10
	Muslim democrat	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0	0	0
	Conservative democrat	0	0.00	12	41.38	0	0	0	0
	Political Islam	0	0.00	3	10.34	0	0	0	0
	Anarchist	4	5.13	0	0	2	12.5	0	0
	Communist	3	3.85	0	0	5	31.25	0	0
	Other	1	1.28	1	3.45	0	0	1	10

Appendix C: Accuracy Perception in accordance with Religious Identity

Sunni participants

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	6.82	43.18	35.23	9.09	5.68
2	7.87	23.60	41.57	12.36	14.61
3	3.45	22.99	35.63	19.54	18.39
4	5.75	16.09	33.33	25.29	19.54
5	4.55	21.59	29.55	25.00	19.32
6	9.30	29.07	31.40	15.12	15.12
7	18.18	19.32	22.73	21.59	18.18
8	12.64	27.59	32.18	17.24	10.34
9	3.41	14.77	35.23	25.00	21.59
10	26.97	29.21	31.46	4.49	7.87
11	20.69	22.99	35.63	14.94	5.75
12	13.95	18.60	32.56	19.77	15.12

Alevi participants

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	6.25	43.75	37.50	6.25	6.25
2	12.50	25.00	25.00	31.25	6.25
3	7.14	21.43	42.86	28.57	0.00
4	6.67	6.67	40.00	26.67	20.00
5	6.67	13.33	40.00	20.00	20.00
6	6.25	43.75	12.50	25.00	12.50
7	20.00	13.33	40.00	20.00	6.67
8	6.25	25.00	43.75	18.75	6.25
9	6.67	20.00	40.00	20.00	13.33
10	37.50	37.50	12.50	12.50	0.00
11	31.25	18.75	37.50	6.25	6.25
12	12.50	18.75	25.00	37.50	6.25

Atheist and agnostic participants

Q no.	Completely True (%)	Mostly True (%)	Partly True, Partly False (%)	Mostly False (%)	Completely False (%)
1	6.90	31.03	34.48	17.24	10.34
2	3.33	16.67	26.67	36.67	16.67
3	3.57	21.43	17.86	28.57	28.57
4	6.90	13.79	20.69	24.14	34.48
5	3.45	13.79	27.59	37.93	17.24
6	6.67	40.00	16.67	23.33	13.33
7	10.00	26.67	23.33	23.33	16.67
8	0.00	24.14	27.59	34.48	13.79
9	6.67	13.33	20.00	23.33	36.67
10	33.33	33.33	16.67	10.00	6.67
11	6.90	37.93	31.03	20.69	3.45
12	3.33	23.33	26.67	20.00	26.67

Appendix D: Opinions about Immigration according to Party Preferences

Immigration as a threat

	AKP	CHP	HDP	MHP
Definitely agree	27.59	65.38	25.00	60.00
Agree	24.14	23.08	12.50	30.00
Neither agree nor disagree	24.14	10.26	12.50	0.00
Disagree	20.69	1.28	37.50	10.00
Definitely disagree	3.45	0.00	12.50	0.00

Immigration as an opportunity

	AKP	CHP	HDP	MHP
Definitely agree	3.45	1.28	0.00	0.00
Agree	6.90	0.00	6.25	20.00
Neither agree nor disagree	24.14	10.26	25.00	10.00
Disagree	37.93	51.28	31.25	20.00
Definitely disagree	27.59	37.18	37.50	50.00

Appendix E: Feelings on the Syrian Immigrants according to Party Preferences

	AKP	CHP	HDP	MHP
Dislike	10.34	38.16	12.50	40.00
Affection	13.79		12.50	
Compassion	41.38	14.47	25.00	20.00
Indifference	20.69	22.37	12.50	
Indifference-Affection-Dislike			12.50	
Acceptance			18.75	
Hatred-Sympathy-Ostracism				10.00